Missed ATC Communications May Have Preceded Potomac Midair Collision

NTSB investigators on Feb. 9 document the wreckage of the aircraft involved in the Jan. 29, 2025, mid-air collision near DCA. Credit: NTSB

Pilots of a U.S. Army helicopter involved in the Jan. 29 midair collision with an American Airlines regional jet may not have received crucial instructions issued by an air traffic controller (ATC) managing both aircraft, the NTSB said Feb. 14.

Investigators have determined parts of two messages from a controller in Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport’s (DCA) tower may not have been heard by pilots in the UH-60H Black Hawk. Information gleaned from the helicopter’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR) suggest at least one of the key instructions may have been cut off by interference—developments that could help explain why the helicopter crew seemingly never saw the CRJ-700 regional jet operating as American Flight 5342 (AA5342).

One instruction, issued about 2 min. before the accident, informed the helicopter pilots that the CRJ was in the area. The controller provided the jet’s approximate location, altitude and a note that it would be changing course, or “circling to Runway 33,” on its approach.

“CVR data from the Black Hawk indicated that the portion of the transmission stating the CRJ was circling may not have been received by the Black Hawk crew,” NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy said during a media briefing. “We hear the word ‘circling’ in ATC communications, but we do not hear the word ‘circling’ on the CVR of the Black Hawk,” she continued, adding that NTSB’s recorders experts “are evaluating this.”

Then, just 17 sec. before the collision, the controller told the Black Hawk crew to pass behind the CRJ, which was on final approach to Runway 33 and coming from the southbound Black Hawk’s east—left—side, the NTSB confirmed. But the helicopter crew apparently did not receive the key “pass behind” part of the message.

“Data from the Black Hawk indicated that the portion of the transmission that stated ‘pass behind the’ may not have been received by the Black Hawk crew because someone keyed a mic to communicate with the controller,” Homendy said. “The transmission was stepped on by an 0.8-sec mic key from the Black Hawk.”

In a follow-up response 2 sec. later, a Black Hawk pilot told the other crewmembers that ATC was telling them to move left, toward the Potomac River’s east bank.

The newly revealed problems increase the spotlight on communications between ATC and the pilots. Information released by the NTSB to date includes no ATC transmissions to the American crew about the Black Hawk or any other helicopter traffic.

The tower controller’s initial message to the Black Hawk crew that included the potentially missed “circling to land” instruction was apparently not paired with a similar alert to the CRJ pilots concerning the helicopter.

If accurate, the absence of an equal exchange is an apparent procedural breakdown.

“That’s the biggest thing that stood out from an air traffic perspective,” said one source who has worked as a controller in busy airspace. “Traffic was called for one but it wasn’t exchanged with the other aircraft involved.”

Homendy emphasized that the NTSB’s probe remains in its early, fact-gathering stages. Among the datasets the board is still working to confirm is the Black Hawk’s altitude during its flight down the Potomac River to DCA’s east.

Investigators have determined that the Black Hawk and CRJ collided at an altitude of about 280 ft. above the river, or 80 ft. above the designated helicopter flightpath’s maximum altitude. Still to be verified is what altitude the Black Hawk pilots were seeing on their instruments.

“We are seeing conflicting information in the data, which is why we aren’t releasing altitude for the Black Hawk’s entire route,” Homendy said.

While a discrepancy between the Black Hawk’s actual altitude and the altitude the pilots believed they were flying at may have played a role in the accident’s outcome, the board’s latest update further supports the idea that the helicopter pilots never saw the regional jet. “We do not have any indication that the Black Hawk crew would have seen” the regional jet, Homendy said.

Data from AA5342’s CVR and flight data recorder suggest the American crew saw the Black Hawk just before the collision. The CRJ’s pitch was 9 deg. nose-up and increasing at the time of impact, its elevators deflected maximum nose-up, and its roll angle was 11 deg. left wing down.

Homendy clarified that, contrary to earlier information provided by the board, both aircraft were communicating via VHF. However, the aircraft were not on the same frequencies. This meant that while pilots in both the helicopter and CRJ heard everything the controller said, they could not hear each other.

The board is still analyzing a traffic collision avoidance system alert received by the CRJ about 20 sec. before the collision to determine if the Black Hawk was the other target, Homendy said. She confirmed that the Black Hawk’s ADS-Out functionality was not operating.

“We don’t know why it wasn’t transmitting,” she said, adding that explanations range from equipment problems to pilots’ choice to disable it, as is permitted for military flights.

The helicopter flight was a combined annual and night-vision check ride, Homendy said. Investigators have determined that the three-person Black Hawk crew was most likely outfitted in night-vision goggles (NVG) “given the nature of the flight,” she continued. “Had they been removed, the crew was required to have a discussion about going unaided. There is no evidence on the cockpit voice recorder ... of such a discussion.”

The NTSB is working with stakeholders including Sikorsky and Collins Aerospace to validate altitude and flight deck instrument data, Homendy said. They also will work to determine what if any ramifications the NVGs may have had on the Black Hawk pilots’ situational awareness.

“It’s going to be a factor in our visibility study,” Homendy said. “We’re going to have to see what was possible for them to see at the time leading up to the collision and the accident sequence.”